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In order to understand the way Kant deals with the topic of religious 
intolerance we must reconstruct three aspects of his theoretical and practi-
cal philosophy, namely, the principle of non-coercive force of religious be-
lief, the principle of truthfulness regarding matters of faith, and the criteria 
of publicity regarding public affairs, which includes matters of faith. These 
aspects determine how the state and politics may and should deal with re-
ligion, particularly with problems of religious intolerance. Each principle 
will be thoroughly presented and analysed below.
1. The theoretical and practical non-coercive force of religious belief
Following Kant’s positions, we could say that the only way to have 
peaceful coexistence between different peoples with distinct historical reli-
gious beliefs is by means of a critique of pure reason that establishes, once 
and for all, what an object of possible knowledge is and how it differs from 
an object of belief or faith. One of the main consequences of Kant’s critical 
philosophy is that religion and everything related to it are incapable of 
coercive force, both theoretical and moral. 
The theoretical non-enforcement regarding objects of religion is due 
to a qualitative rather than a quantitative distinction between one statement 
endowed with “truth-value” and another limited to merely “belief-value”. 
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While judgments regarding God, the immortality of the soul, and free-
dom aspire the status of theoretical knowledge, they have to be considered 
simply false when compared to other theoretical and scientific assertions. 
The only possibility for religion to gain any rational legitimacy is when its 
theoretical aspirations are restricted to the field of belief. That is one of the 
meanings of Kant’s well-known assertion: “I had to deny knowledge in 
order to make room for faith” (KrV, B xxx)2, which also means that objects 
of faith should not aspire to be considered knowledge. 
According to the Transcendental deduction of categories, being an 
object of possible knowledge means to satisfy requirements of the legiti-
mate operation of our cognitive faculties. So, for example, the concept of 
causality must be applicable to any event, which is specifically located in a 
determined space and time. In this sense, it is a condition of the use of our 
categories that they can only be applied to something that may be given 
(the phenomenon) or constructed (in the case of the objects of mathemat-
ics) in our intuition (cf. KrV, B147-149). However, by being given in in-
tuition the object would already be subordinate to the formal conditions of 
our sensibility and to what constitutes the form of the phenomena, namely, 
the formal structure of nature given by the categories applied to the sensi-
ble forms of space and time. Consequently, there are two options. On the 
one hand, an event/object is given in the intuition and it can necessarily be 
known as being caused by an earlier event/object and is therefore not self-
caused. On the other, said event/object cannot be given in intuition and, in 
this case, it is not an object of possible knowledge. In the case something 
calling itself God appears in our intuition, then we could be sure that it 
cannot be God, because then we could discover its cause and then it would 
cease to be an uncaused being. If, on the other hand, God could not be giv-
en in our intuition, then he could not be considered an object of possible 
knowledge.
Therefore, Kant’s transcendental philosophy establishes that God, 
freedom and the immortality of the soul are objects that remain outside 
the field of our possible experience and so they can ever be considered 
objects of our possible theoretical knowledge. This delimitation does not 
arise from an exhaustive analysis of the objects effectively in the field of 
our possible experience, which is potentially infinite. A critique of pure 
reason does not evaluate objects, but the faculty of reason itself (cf. KrV, B 
xxi‑xxix). Moreover, based on the analysis and evaluation of the way our 
2  All translations of Kant’s works are quoted from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
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faculties of knowledge work, Kant states that God could never be an object 
of possible knowledge. 
We must also distinguish between the objects of belief and those 
of opinion, as they have distinct natures. Objects of opinion are not yet 
objects of knowledge, but they could become so, were certain conditions 
to be fulfilled, such as, being empirically determined by our intuition. On 
the other hand, objects of belief or faith can never be objects of theoretical 
knowledge, because, by definition, they can not be objects inside the struc-
ture of nature. So, the existence of alien life on other planets is an object of 
opinion, which might be more or less plausible, but, in principle, could be 
proven if we were to have empirical intuition of these beings or if we found 
strong evidence of their existence. On the other hand, the existence of God 
is not something that could ever be an object of our intuition. Therefore, 
God can not be an object of opinion. 
Moreover, religious belief can not call for practical enforcement, 
either form an ethical nor a juridical perspective. Religious beliefs can nei-
ther enforce their judgments by relating them to the foundation of morality 
nor as a consequence of moral law. 
Regarding the level of the foundation of morality, religious morality 
is based on the concept of perfection, from either a theological or ontolog-
ical perspective. Those theological versions of perfection state that moral-
ity takes place when agents try to fit their actions to a model derived from 
the concept of perfect divine will. In this case, because we cannot intui-
tively access this concept of perfection, we have two possibilities. Firstly, 
we might conceive it from the point of view of what we consider to be our 
noblest nature, the concept of good will, but then we fall into a vicious 
circle (because we extract from this concept what we already have put into 
it). Or, on the other hand, we would devise a concept of perfection based 
on divine will which is “still left to us, made up of the attributes of desire 
for glory and dominion combined with dreadful representations of power 
and vengefulness, [which] would have to be the foundation for a system 
of morals that would be directly opposed to morality” (GMS, AA 04: 443). 
The version based on an ontological concept of perfection also suffers 
from the problem of circularity. In this situation, Kant points out that the 
agent must already desire a model so that they may be constrained by it. 
However, there is no reason that the agent must feel constrained by it in 
the first place. Therefore, choosing between different models of perfection 
becomes a matter of personal or cultural preference. For this reason, such 
models of ontological perfection can only provide us with hypothetical 
imperatives and heteronomy (cf. GMS, 04: 444). So, the religious beliefs 
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related to those hypothetical imperatives have no practical enforcement in 
the strict sense of morality.
Regarding the consequential level of morality, religious beliefs have 
also any practical enforcement. It is well known that Kant tries to relate 
his moral theory to a moral religion. This topic of rational religion or re-
ligion in the boundaries of simple reason is a highly complex and subtle 
issue that is beyond the scope of this paper. What does matter here is that 
Kant still holds that belief cannot be mandated, so religious beliefs can-
not be constrained by the categorical imperative. In other words, religious 
belief does not follow as an immediate consequence from morality and 
autonomy. Moreover, this non-consequential character has to be under-
stood in two senses. Firstly, from the point of view of moral theory, i.e., 
the consciousness of the moral law does not immediately involve the con-
sciousness of the existence of God, nor the immortality of the soul (the 
foundation of almost every religion). Secondly, from the point of view of 
moral practical agency, the categorical imperative does not dictate any 
universal religion or religious belief. Moreover, it does not make sense 
to speak about moral universalizability or the necessity of belief because 
morality only deals with things that are under our control. In other words, 
the same thing that happens with pathological love (cf. GMS, AA 04: 399) 
occurs with belief, namely, they can not be mandated (cf. Log, AA 09: 74). 
Therefore, religious belief is not subject to ethical enforcement, because, 
on the one hand, it does not pass the test of universalizability established 
by the categorical imperative. On the other hand, the act of believing is not 
subject to our will. 
Also from the point of view of Kant’s theory of law, religious belief 
should not be subject to any legal enforcement. Religious belief is always 
grounded in or involves a concept of good and happiness that cannot be 
universalized by the categorical imperative of right, which states: “act ex-
ternally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of 
everyone in accordance with a universal law” (MS, AA 06: 231). Freedom 
is the only basis for right and no religious belief can legitimately claim to 
be institutionalized by law. Therefore, the laws of a republican state, which 
is the only truly legitimate, can never be drawn up and established based 
on a particular concept of religious perfection nor good life, because those 
concepts already presuppose a concept of good or happiness, which is the 
ground for a despotic state (cf. TP, AA 08: 290).
Moreover, “[d]uties in accordance with rightful lawgiving can be 
only external duties, since this lawgiving does not require that the idea of 
this duty, which is internal, itself be the determining ground of the agent’s 
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choice” (MS, AA 06, 219). It is not up to law to establish a duty to be-
lieve, because law is intrinsically related to the faculty of coercion by way 
of pathological determination grounds which are directed to external ac-
tions. While ethics is directed to ends and the intention of the actions, right 
should be restricted to externally conceived actions. “Now, I can indeed be 
constrained by others to perform actions that are directed as means to an 
end, but I can never be constrained by others to have an end: only I my-
self can make something my end.” So, external “coercion to ends (to have 
them) is self-contradictory” (MS, AA 06, 381). Having a belief is not the 
same as choosing or having an end, but both are limited merely to actions 
qua internally conceived actions. In this sense, law can obligate individuals 
to attend church services or even to pretend to believe in some historical 
religion, but it can never oblige individuals to truly accept any religious 
belief. Therefore, the state assumes an unrightful path when it establishes 
laws imposing religious beliefs. Such coercion can only promote falsehood 
and concealment and turn religious belief into something hateful. This is 
exactly the position of Kant regarding Christianity when it tries to add 
some sort of authority (cf. EaD, AA 08, 338). 
In the same way that Kant sees Christianity, we can state that every 
matter strictly related to religious belief must be approached with a “lib-
eral way of thinking”, i.e., we can freely argue about matters of religious 
beliefs and hope that “the effect of its doctrine, through which it may win 
over the hearts of human beings when their understanding has already been 
illuminated by the representation of their duty’s law.” (EaD, AA 08, 338) 
But this “winning of other’s hearts” can only be hoped for as a “free” con-
sequence insofar as this belief does not contradict theoretical and practical 
knowledge and even has the positive effect of promoting them. So we have 
already arrived at the topics of the next two sections, namely, the principle 
of truthfulness and publicity in matters of religious belief.
2. Truthfulness and religious belief
On the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in Theodicy is an en-
lightening essay about the issue of truthfulness in religious beliefs. It starts 
by calling for all of those who argue for and against the possibility of the-
odicy to present their arguments in the court of reason. The final judgment 
follows, in general lines, the arguments presented above, namely that we 
can neither theoretically prove nor disprove the possibility of a theodicy, 
which means that it, as a highly interconnected topic of religion, is neither 
an object of theoretical nor practical knowledge, but only of belief. 
Kant on religious intolerance
Philosophica 51.indd   29 11/04/2018   9:37:23 PM
30
After concluding that theodicy “does not have as much to do with 
a task in the interest of science as, rather, with a matter of faith” (MpVT, 
08:267), Kant goes further and deals with the issue of lying and truthful-
ness regarding the matters of religious belief. He differentiates between 
formal and material truthfulness. Material truthfulness implies taking care 
not to commit an injustice or an error, while formal truthfulness means 
having the consciousness of taking every precaution in a particular case. 
After that Kant points out a fundamental distinction between telling a lie 
and making a false statement. “Truth” and “falsity” are logical aspects of 
judgment, while “truthfulness” and “lying” deal with the attitude of agents 
(cf. MpVT, AA 08: 268). From this point of view, Kant posits that someone 
may offer a false judgment without realizing it, but it is impossible to tell a 
lie without being aware of it. The lie and the truthfulness are attributes of 
agents’ attitude towards their own judgments, which always reflects their 
nature as free beings. Both telling a lie and being truthful are the actions of 
self-aware, free beings; otherwise we could no longer speak of free agents 
or any kind of responsibility. In this case, Kant says, anyone who “lies” to 
themselves may, with time, intensify this habit when they benefit from it, 
but a lie can never be turned into a mere false judgment. In other words, in 
a strict sense, we can never lie to ourselves without knowing it. Therefore, 
lying to ourselves means being hypocritical. 
Now, regarding maters of religious faith Kant asserts that, first of all, 
it is absurd that anyone profess to believe in God or religious dogmas with-
out having made a thorough self‑examination of their own consciousness 
(cf. MpVT, AA 08: 268). Secondly, and more drastically, someone who 
states that their belief is actual knowledge is also telling a lie. Denying that 
religious belief is a totally distinct type of holding-to-be-true than practical 
and theoretical knowledge is also a lie, since it is part of the formal con-
scientiousness of truthfulness to recognize that belief and knowledge are 
two different kinds of holding-to-be-true (Fürwahrhalten). Kant clarifies 
his position by interpreting biblical stories, specifically the debate between 
Job and his friends (MpVT, AA: 08:265ff.). In these passages we can see 
that those who arrogate to themselves the status of representing God’s in-
terests are not only mistaken, but they are lying to themselves and to God. 
They are, therefore, committing an immoral act.
In a similar vein, we can understand Kant’s evaluation of the story of 
Abraham (see SF, AA 07: 63n.). However great and impressive some ex-
ternal phenomena may appear, we must have sufficient sincerity to confess 
that they cannot sustain absolute certainty since they must be submitted to 
theoretical or practical objective principles. Our reason has principles that 
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we can neither deny nor pretend not to listen to. So, even if Abraham in 
fact had heard a voice coming from the sky telling him to murder his son, 
he knew that God could never order such an act. That is why Kant claims 
that Abraham should have said ‘God would never order such a thing’. How 
did Kant come to this position? Because, on the one hand, religious belief 
is independent of the practical and theoretical domains of reason, but this 
does not mean that it can make judgments that contradict principles of pure 
reason. For Kant, this acknowledgment is not limited to the philosopher, 
but is already present in the consciousness of common human reason. 
The truthful recognition that religious belief is not subject to certain-
ty and constitutes neither theoretical nor practical knowledge has nothing 
to do with the importance of the belief to the agent. Religious belief can 
be as psychologically and socially relevant for a person as mathematics, 
science or even morality.3 However, despite this personal and subjective 
importance, everyone must recognize and actually know that religious be-
lief can obligate no one, neither themselves, nor others. In other words, 
every one is aware in some degree that their religious belief, however in-
variable and stable, is distinct from any kind of knowledge, i.e., it is a kind 
of holding-to-be-true that cannot be subject to any kind of imperative (cf. 
SF, AA 08: 42). Since the formal and material criteria of truthfulness is at 
everyone’s disposal, anyone can be aware of the immorality of all kinds 
of religious persecutions or of “casting religious hatred upon others” (cf. 
V-Mo/Collings, AA 27, 453ff.). Therefore, Kant sustains that, in order to 
be truthful, each believer and every religious institution must acknowledge 
that their tenets have neither theoretical nor practical certainty. In other 
words, it is a component of sincerity and truthfulness of character to ac-
knowledge that we do not know objects of religious belief and, therefore, 
that there are no theoretical or practical grounds for any kind of religious 
persecution.
3. Publicity as condition for freedom of religion
According to Kant’s practical philosophy, freedom of religion de-
pends on three different ways in which religion must be related to publici-
ty: 1) the impossibility of particular historical religious maxims passing the 
test of publicity that is required by the positive transcendental principle of 
public law; 2) the right to freedom for the public use of reason concerning 
3  Regarding the invariability that a rational religious belief may have, see WDO, AA 08: 141.
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issues of religion and, finally; 3) the assurance and promotion of that free-
dom at two levels, firstly through the guarantee of the legal conflict of fac-
ulties and, secondly, by fostering public education that teaches the mean-
ing and the exercise of publicity regarding religious themes at school.
The first aspect of publicity in issues of religion refers to the impos-
sibility of any strictly religious principle passing the test of the political-ju-
ridical principle of publicity which is understood to be the transcendental 
principle of public law. So, we have a priori a moral-political criterion 
for knowing whether political action may be considered justified, namely: 
“All actions relating to the rights of others are wrong if their maxim is 
incompatible with publicity” (ZeF, AA 08: 381). If a particular religious 
group in a pluralistic country tries to change the laws of the state, or even 
the political government, in accordance with its religious principles, for the 
sake of its political or financial interests, then, according to Kant, is easy 
to see how their goals will fail if publicly announced. Other religious and 
non-religious groups would disagree with such a policy and would block 
these changes. In other words, the only way such a goal could expect to be 
successful would be if it were carried out in silence. Therefore, the maxims 
that would fail to achieve their ends when publicized could not be harmo-
nized with the principle of publicity.
However, this ‘negative’ criterion of publicity is not sufficient for 
a political maxim to be considered morally good, since it could still be 
publicized when a group is sufficiently powerful to impose their moral 
world-view upon others. In order to avoid this kind of problem, Kant ad-
vances a positive criterion for testing the legitimacy of political action, 
namely “all maxims which need publicity (in order not to fail in their end) 
harmonize with right and politics combined.” (ZeF, AA 08: 386). The pos-
itive formulation states that when an end can be achieved only upon being 
publicly announced, then it can be rationally accepted by all. The intrinsic 
characteristics of religious beliefs make it impossible for them to pass the 
criteria of the positive principle of public law and to expect to be rationally 
accepted by all. So, for example, to “claim universal validity for a dogma 
(catholicismus hierarchius) involves a contradiction: for unconditioned 
universality presupposes necessity, and since this occurs only where rea-
son itself provides sufficient grounds for the tenets of faith, no mere statute 
can be universally valid” (SF, AA 07: 49). Thus, everyone should agree to 
the freedom of religious worship, whether or not they believe in any histor-
ical religion. But not everyone might agree to grant the right of freedom of 
religious worship to some historical religion (sometimes Kant call this ec-
clesiastical faith (cf. SF, AA 07: 42)) that publicly expresses its intolerance 
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or its intention to politically impose its ends on others. It would be impos-
sible for an atheist or even an enlightened religious citizen to accept that 
this historical religion might have the right to turn its dogmas into law. So, 
freedom of religious worship has a moral limitation defined by publicity, a 
limit of right. Therefore, issues concerning strictly religious matters should 
be kept out of politics. Here we can see the republican branch of Kant’s 
moral philosophy, namely, that we do not have nor should we put up with 
intolerant historical religions (RGV, AA 06: 96). 
The second aspect of the relationship between religion and publicity 
concerns the right to freedom for a public use of reason on issues of reli-
gion and the legitimacy and importance of the legal conflict of faculties. 
Publicity can be defined as the condition through which something can be 
publicly spoken; it is the capacity to manifest out loud our own opinion 
(either in speech or in writing). Publicity is opposed to any limitations on 
the freedom of speech and to legally or socially forced secrecy about opin-
ions, beliefs and thoughts. Publicity regarding matters of religion means 
the freedom to make public use of our own reason about matters of reli-
gion. In the essay of Enlightenment, Kant focuses chiefly on matters of 
religion, because, as he states, religious tutelage and religious minority is 
not just “the most harmful”, but it “is also the most disgraceful of all” (WA, 
AA 08: 41). When a clergyman says “do not argue but believe!” (WA, AA 
08: 37), he opens the door to a complete heteronomy of practical reason, 
which transforms human beings into simple means or things. Human be-
ings become animals wearing a yoke: they become incapable of ‘walking 
confidently’ and taking a ‘leap over even the narrowest ditch’ by them-
selves. When clergymen say “do not argue but believe!”, they are also 
being immoral: firstly, because they are putting themselves in the position 
of God’s representatives and also, in an arrogant and hypocritical way, 
as God’s interpreters. This goes against the principles of truthfulness and 
sincerity that are the grounds of all morality. Secondly, said clergymen are 
taking a path that undermines the fundamental right to self-enlightenment. 
When a government reinforces this clergymen’s immoral posture via legal 
coercion, then the state undermines its own legitimacy, because “what a 
people may never decide upon for itself, a monarch may still less decide 
upon for a people; for his legislative authority rests precisely on this, that 
he unites in his will the collective will of the people”. Therefore, “[o]ne 
can indeed, for his own person and even then only for some time, postpone 
enlightenment in what it is incumbent upon him to know; but to renounce 
enlightenment, whether for his own person or even more so for posterity, 
is to violate the sacred right of humanity and trample it underfoot” (WA, 
Kant on religious intolerance
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AA 08: 39f.). “Thus the prohibition of publicity impedes the progress of a 
people toward improvement, even in that which applies to the least of its 
claims, namely its simple, natural right.” (SF, AA 07: 89)
Publicity in matters of religion means that religious issues should be 
brought to the public space respecting the criteria that guide the freedom 
of the public use of reason. There are two requirements: that of a specific 
space and moment and; that of a specific behaviour. So, for example, “a 
clergyman is bound to deliver his discourse to the pupils in his catechism 
class and to his congregation in accordance with the creed of the church 
he serves, for he was employed by it on that condition.” (WA, AA 08: 38) 
In the same way, no one has the right to invade a religious service and 
question the clergyman during prayer. However, the freedom of the public 
use of reason guarantees that the clergymen can put forward their doubts 
and make interpretative suggestions regarding church’s orthodoxy when 
meeting with priests or when taking part in a public debate. Similarly, each 
individual has the right to publicize or to express their opinions regarding 
the interpretation of the Bible or other religious matters in books, jour-
nals, news or hand-outs. Moreover, the second criterion establishes that 
the public use of reason requires a certain form of conduct, i.e., it must be 
performed in the same manner that an erudite person would have done. In 
other words, the public use of reason, in order to respect the laws of free-
dom, must be grounded in rational arguments and reject any sophistry that 
might appeal to unjustified fears or prejudices.
The third way in which religion must be related to publicity is when 
the state takes part in guaranteeing and promoting the freedom of the pub-
lic use of reason about religious issues. This state’s positive engagement in 
the enlightenment processes could be questioned (cf. RGV, AA 06: 95f.), 
however, is very important to realize that, for Kant, what must be avoided 
is the use of force by the state or the imposition of religious enlightenment 
by means of legal and juridical coercion. This would be the case if some-
one were be punished for not participating in the public use of reason or 
for not having ethical ends. This is very different from the state taking 
positive measures to promote publicity. So, the state must not just stop hin-
dering the progress of enlightenment, but also, indeed, it should promote 
the same by assuring a ‘healthy environment’ for the good formation of a 
moral mode of thought (IaG, AA 08: 26). This positive fostering involves 
two spheres of institutional support: 1st. the institutional assurance of the 
freedom of public use of reason, especially by university scholars; and, 
2nd. the public teaching of the principles of publicity to children. 
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The first sphere refers to ensuring the legal conflict of faculties at the 
university (cf. SF, AA 07: 29). According to Kant, this means to avoid both 
material and formal illegality. Material illegality occurs when the state es-
tablishes a censorship which blocks the freedom of public use of reason as 
such, therefore, the capacity of thought as such (cf. WDO, AA 08: 144). 
On the other hand, formal illegality does not prevent the debate itself, but 
is grounded on a sort of sophistry, which results in the inevitable defeat of 
reason and the faculty of Philosophy. So, when there is a legal conflict of 
faculties inside the university, the parts have no right to appeal either to the 
government or to the prejudices of the people (cf. SF, AA 07: 34n.). 
In a legal conflict of faculties Kant believes that philosophy can pose 
questions to theology. Mostly, however, it can show theology how to co-
herently use its historical doctrine through the touchstone of a critique of 
pure reason and the concepts of practical reason. This means, for example, 
that all historical religions should realize that anthropomorphisms have ex-
tremely harmful consequences when they surpass the symbolic representa-
tion (cf. RGV, AA 06: 64n). Another example of enlightenment fostered 
by the legal conflict between philosophy and theology is that without the 
moral archetypes provided by pure practical reason, historical religions 
would become devoid of all moral content (cf. RGV, AA 06: 104).
The state can also encourage moral enlightenment within historical 
religious institutions, not only by allowing but also by promoting the con-
flict of the faculties. Clergymen, like every other profession working inside 
the state, are subject to its regulation. This means that the state has the right 
to demand a good education of those who will work in a house of worship. 
This education has two aspects: firstly, a good knowledge of the historical 
groundings of some specific historical religious beliefs (e.g., knowledge of 
biblical exegesis) and; secondly, an adequate knowledge of the supreme 
moral principle and the grounds of the republican state (cf. RGV, AA 06: 
10). In this way, the state does not interfere directly in the orthodoxy of 
historical religions, but indirectly by promoting the good moral education 
of clergymen. It is important to note that this does not constitute a direct 
intervention of the state in matters of religion, but only a guarantee of the 
fruitful, legal conflict of faculties. After all, how would this important con-
flict take place if one of the parties refused to participate? In other words, 
how would a legal conflict of faculties be possible if one of the faculties 
withdrew from the university and from the arena of public debate? This 
posture would reveal a kind of sectarianism that could only undermine the 
legitimacy of the republican state. Therefore, the state should not interfere 
Kant on religious intolerance
Philosophica 51.indd   35 11/04/2018   9:37:23 PM
36
in the particular affairs of historical religions, but it can and should take 
two measures: firstly, it must ensure that historical religions do not under-
mine the moral values upon which the state and law are grounded (the idea 
of equal freedom) and; secondly, the state has the right to promote the good 
education of clergymen in order to avoid sectarian education. However, 
it is not the state itself that takes care of the education of clergymen, but 
the university, which, Kant argues, must have some autonomy from the 
state and be set up as a community of scholars organized in a republican 
fashion. But what can philosophy teach to students of theology? Again, it 
could teach that any legitimate interpretation of a holy book, such as the 
Bible, must be symbolic and must be grounded in moral concepts, i.e., that 
religion must always strive to present the moral law in religious narratives. 
Another point is the importance of the clear distinction between knowl-
edge and belief and that the latter always presupposes the free acceptance 
of the believer. 
The second sphere where the state may act to ensure freedom of 
investigation and religious toleration is by including in school curricula 
the meaning and the importance of the freedom of the public use of reason. 
Even when the government intends to ensure the legal conflict of faculties 
at university, an ignorant people corrupted by sectarian clergymen could 
force an illegal conflict inside society. In order to avoid this kind of social 
intolerance, the state has the right to intervene and to establish public pol-
icy regarding the educational system (cf. MpVT, AA 08:269; SF, AA 07: 
42; TP, AA 08: 288.). 
Those external and internal blind professions of faith are related to 
the topics discussed above, namely, that untruthfulness of religious belief is 
present in each historical religion that fails to recognize their lack of coercive 
force, be it theoretical or practical. Public purification of this hypocrisy may 
occur only when the state takes into its hands the protection of the freedom 
of the public use of reason. This does not mean that the state should coerce 
people into believing in some religion. It does mean that the state should 
not only permit and promote the legal conflict of faculties, but it may also 
ensure that the principle of publicity is promoted by public education and 
social life of society. In other words, enlightenment is a process that should 
be promoted by the state through public education (cf. SF, AA 07: 92f), al-
though it cannot be forced or imposed by law. In other words, the state can 
only protect the enlightenment process of its citizens when it takes into its 
hands the task of educating the populous about the meaning, the importance, 
and the use of the public principle of publicity. This pedagogical policy is 
another condition for the freedom of religion and religious tolerance. 
Joel Klein
Philosophica 51.indd   36 11/04/2018   9:37:23 PM
37
4. Final Remarks
In Kantian Moral Philosophy, freedom is the ground for all legitimate 
interpersonal relationships, whether ethical, legal, or political. Freedom is 
also the condition and the limit of issues regarding religion. For this rea-
son, we can say that it is freedom that sanctions religion and not religion 
that sanctions freedom. In this case, when a clash between freedom and 
religion takes place, it is religion that has to step aside. Analysing Kant’s 
treatment regarding the theme of religious tolerance, we can see how Kant 
reconciles aspects of liberalism and republicanism in his practical philos-
ophy. As a liberal, Kant sees that the freedom of religion is an innate right 
that must be guaranteed by law. However, as a republican, he also realizes 
that in order this freedom to be real it must be nourished and protected, and 
the state must therefore take institutional measures in this regard. So, free-
dom of religion is something that must be accepted by the state, but it need 
not be extended to religions that fail to grant the same moral right to others.
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ABSTRACT
According to Kantian philosophy, it is freedom that should sanction reli-
gion and not religion that should sanction freedom. This thesis is the basic condi-
tion for religious tolerance, and it is grounded in three principles that regulate the 
relationship between politics and religion, namely: the principle of non-coercive 
force of religious belief; the moral requirement of truthfulness in professions of 
belief; and, the submission of religion to the principle of publicity. The objective 
of this paper is to present, explain and justify the application of these three princi-
ples towards the notion of religion and to indicate how they might help to under-
stand political and moral issues regarding religious intolerance. 
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RESUMO
De acordo com a filosofia kantiana, é a liberdade que deve sancionar a 
religião e não a religião que deve sancionar a liberdade. Esta tese é a condição 
básica para a tolerância religiosa, e é fundamentada em três princípios que regu-
lam a relação entre política e religião, a saber: o princípio da força não‑coerciva 
da crença religiosa; o requisito moral da veracidade nas profissões de crença; e 
a submissão da religião ao princípio da publicidade. O objectivo deste artigo é o 
de apresentar, explicar e justificar a aplicação desses três princípios em relação à 
noção de religião e indicar como eles podem ajudar a compreender questões políti-
cas e morais relacionadas com a intolerância religiosa.
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